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Tak ing Rep re sen ta tion Se ri ously
Expertise, Participation and the Government 
of Risks
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU
I ex am ine in this ar ti cle cer tain nor ma tive is sues per tain ing to the sci ence – poli-
tics re la tion ship. I de scribe a num ber of re cent stud ies1 that – ac knowl edg ing the 
in creas ing role of sci en tific ex per tise for po liti cal de ci sions, dis cuss the po ten tial le-
giti macy prob lem that arises from that re la tion ship. To an swer the de fined le giti-
macy prob lem, these ac counts sug gest that more in clu sive, pub lic par tici pa tory 
de moc ratic pro ce dures should be put in place in the col lec tion and use of ex per-
tise, so that the trend to wards the sci en ti fi za tion of poli tics can be coun ter bal anced 
by one of de moc ra tiz ing ex per tise it self.
The pub lic par tici pa tory ac counts have not, of course, de buted with the di lem-
mas of sci en tific ad vice in po liti cal de ci sion-mak ing. There is a grow ing body of 
stud ies in de moc ratic the ory that – to men tion only Ben ja min Bar ber and Seyla 
Ben habib2 – have ad vo cated a ”stronger” de moc racy, a radi cally in clu sive and par-
tici pa tory de ci sion-mak ing set ting. But this lit era ture, which claims to ex pose the 
nor ma tive in ade quacy of the more clas si cal ac counts of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, 
has found a re newed sup port from a num ber of ob serv ers of the sci ence and poli-
tics re la tion ship, [i.e. con tribu tors to Sci ence and Tech nol ogy Stud ies (STS), po liti-
cal phi loso phers and phi loso phers of sci ence, etc]. The prob lem atic nor ma tive role 
of sci en tific ex per tise in pol icy-mak ing is of fer ing a new ground for ac counts that 
aim to re place po liti cal rep re sen ta tion by a com bi na tion of ana lytic, de lib era tive 
and in clu sive par tici pa tory pro ce dures.
My aim in this ar ti cle is to ques tion the main fram ing of the prob lem of le giti-
macy of sci en tific ex per tise in po liti cal pol icy-mak ing, as it is pre sent in the radi cal 
par tici pa tory ac counts dis cussed be low. I ex pose a num ber of short com ings of 
these ac counts; while rais ing the ”le giti macy of ex per tise” is sue and draw ing at-
ten tion to the cur rent re la tion ship be tween sci ence and poli tics, they of fer a re duc-
tion ist view of the nor ma tive is sues in volved. Then, I raise a more gen eral ob jec tion 
against some of the cur rent nor ma tive ar gu ments for pub lic par tici pa tion, which 
rely on a pro ce dural re quire ment in or der to solve deep sub stan tial, struc tural prob-
lems. The aim, through out this study, is to re vi tal ize theo reti cal in ter est in the rich nor-
ma tive po ten tial and the ana lyti cal ade quacy of the con cept of politi cal rep re sen ta tion. 
1 Bruno LATOUR, Politics of Nature. How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, transl. by C. Porter, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2004; Sheila JASANOFF, States of Knowledge. The 
Co-Production of Science and Social Order, Routledge, London, 2004, and Designs on Nature. Science and 
Democracy in Europe and the United States, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005. 
2 Benjamin BARBER, Strong Democracy: Participatory Democracy for a New Age, University of 
California Press, 1984; Seyla BENHABIB (ed.), Democracy and Difference, Contesting the Boundaries 
of the Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996; Iris Marion YOUNG, Inclusion and 
Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
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I also con tend that greater ac count abil ity de pends on greater ca pac ity for po liti cal 
rep re sen ta tion, and not (ex clu sively) on lar ger par tici pa tion, and this is es pe cially 
visi ble in the prob lem atic of sci en tific ad vice for po liti cal de ci sion-mak ing.
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
OF THE LEGITIMACY OF EXPERTISE
Risk and un cer tainty have lately emerged as the cen tral topic of a large area of 
theo reti cal and em piri cal re search in so cial sci ences1. Driven some times by the con-
cern to re-con cep tu al ize and in te grate the prob lem atic of risk in cur rent theo ries, 
con cepts such as regu la tion and gov ern ance2 tend to re place more tra di tional no-
tions used to un der stand and theo rize po liti cal in sti tu tions, re la tions and struc-
tures. The role of sci en tific ex per tise in gov ern ment, which in fact never leaved the 
con cerns of po liti cal phi loso phers, is now in creas ingly in voked in the dis courses 
deal ing with the choices and po liti cal re spon si bil ity con cern ing in ter-gen era tional 
jus tice, tech no logi cal pro gress, dis tri bu tion of risks and the pur pose of in no va tion.
It has be come a wide spread view, these last years, that the clas si cal cate go ries of 
po liti cal the ory no longer re flect the rap idly chang ing na ture of po liti cal and non-po-
liti cal en ti ties and re la tions that af fect our lives in a global con text, and that tra di-
tional in sti tu tions are pow er less in the face of novel chal lenges. Fast com mu ni ca tion, 
global reach of eco nomic ac tors and the global scope of en vi ron mental, tech no logi cal, 
and health risks cre ate the need for a new nor ma tive set ting in which, among other 
con cep tual in no va tions, gov ern ance re places gov ern ment.
This view is also con sid ered to ap ply to the chang ing re la tions be tween sci en tific 
ex per tise and con tem po rary de moc ratic in sti tu tions. The terms of these re la tions are 
no longer, ac cord ing to most ob serv ers, gov erned by the post-war un der stand ing of 
the re la tion be tween sci ence and gov ern ment. The ref er ence for that part ner ship be-
tween the post-war Ameri can (and, by ex ten sions, west ern) gov ern ments and the sci-
en tific com mu nity is Vanevar Bush’s Sci ence – The End less Fron tier, which con ceived 
in 1945 a par ticu lar struc ture of the in ser tion of sci en tific re search into a na tion’s 
wider de vel op men tal and stra te gic con cerns. Elabo rated at the re quest of Presi dent 
Roose velt, the re port jus ti fied im por tant pub lic fund ing of ma jor sci en tific re search 
pro jects, as well as a form of auton omy for the sci en tific com mu nity, un der the as-
sump tion that – di rectly or in di rectly, these sci en tific ad vances will have a cru cial ef-
fect on the coun try’s se cu rity, and will prove es sen tial ”to our bet ter health, to more 
jobs, to a higher stan dard of liv ing, and to our cul tural pro gress”3.
1 Peter Taylor GOOBY, Jens O. ZINN (eds.), Risk in Social Science, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2006; Christopher HOOD, Henry ROTHSTEIN, Robert BALDWIN, The Government of 
Risk. Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kip VISCUSI, 
Rational Risk Policy: The 1996 Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures, Clarendon Press-Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998; Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Laws Of Fear: Beyond The Precautionary Principle, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2005.
2 ”Governance” has an increasing presence in many documents issued by national and 
European bodies that aim to tackle the normative complexity of current institutional innova-
tions, as well as an answer to the perceived “deficit of legitimacy” in Europe. 
3 Vanevar BUSH, Science – The Endless Frontier, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1945. 
Taking Representation Seriously 235
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 2 • 2008
Un der this ”so cial con tract”, as it has been char ac ter ized by many schol ars1, 
gov ern ments con fer auton omy and pub lic fund ing for ba sic re search, while the re-
sults of this fun da men tal re search will – sooner or later – trans late into, and con-
soli date the tech no logi cal pro gress and the sci en tific ex per tise that rap idly be come 
an in con tournable part of po liti cal de ci sion-mak ing.
In risk regu la tion set tings, this per spec tive cor re sponds to a sharp di vi sion be-
tween the sci en tific and the po liti cal ele ments of de ci sion-mak ing. The regu la tory proc-
ess, ac cord ing to this tra di tional view, is made up of sev eral dis tinct phases, the main 
two be ing risk as sess ment and risk man age ment. Risk as sess ment is sup posed to be en-
tirely sci en tific, ob jec tive, truth-track ing, while risk man age ment, on the con trary, in te-
grates that sci en tific as sess ment in the po liti cal de ci sion-mak ing, i.e., in trade-offs 
be tween val ues, in ter ests of dif fer ent con stitu en cies and other so cial pri ori ties, that con-
sti tute the task of ac count able (di rectly or in di rectly) po liti cal au thori ties.
In re cent dec ades, how ever, this view of the re la tion ship of sci en tific ex per tise 
and poli tics is no longer ac cepted by an in creas ing num ber of schol ars. They of ten 
point out that, far from be ing autono mous and ob jec tive, the sci en tific ex per tise 
that de fines the risk as sess ments, and the regu la tory proc esses in gen eral, is nei ther. 
Im por tant works in the field of so ci ol ogy of knowl edge or Sci ence and Tech nol ogy 
Stud ies such as those of Helga Nowotny and Mi chael Gib bons2, have drawn the at-
ten tion to the dif fer ence be tween two dis tinct modes of pro duc tion of knowl edge. 
The sci ence-for-pol icy, or regu la tory sci ence, is pro duced un der a dif fer ent mode 
than ba sic re search.
”The old para digm of scientiﬁc discovery (’Mode 1’) – characterized 
by the hegemony of theoretical or, at any rate, experimental science; by an 
internally-driven taxonomy of disciplines; and by the autonomy of scientists 
and their host institutions, the universities – [is] being superseded by a new 
paradigm of knowledge production (’Mode 2’), which [is] socially distributed, 
application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities.”3
In a re cent study, Gib bons, Nowotny and Scott de scribe what they un der-
stand as be ing the new con text and the new ”Mode 2” of pro duc tion of knowl-
edge. If La tour al ready pressed the dis tinc tion be tween ”sci ence” and ”re search”4, 
Nowotny et al. de scribe an en vi ron ment in which re search is ”steered” by vari ous 
fund ing bod ies; it is sub ject to an in creas ing ”com mer ciali za tion” – partly due to 
fund ing en vi ron ments, partly to the is sues re lated to in tel lec tual prop erty; uni ver si-
ties and other re search cen ters have be come more ”ac count able” – in the sense of be-
ing ”man aged”, the qual ity and ef fec tive ness of re search as sessed; it is ”gen er ated in 
a con text, […] dif fer ent from the proc ess of ap pli ca tion by which ’pure’ sci ence, gen er-
ated in theo reti cal/ex peri men tal en vi ron ments, is ’ap plied’”; and fi nally,
1 Sheila JASANOFF, Designs on Nature, Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005.
2 Michael GIBBONS, Camille LIMOGES, Helga NOWOTNY, Simon SCHWARTZMAN, 
Peter SCOTT, Martin TROW, The New Production of Knowledge, Sage Publications, London, 1994; 
Helga NOWOTNY, Peter SCOTT, Michael GIBBONS, Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the 
Public in an Age of Uncertainty, Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 2001. 
3 Helga NOWOTNY, Michael GIBBONS, Peter SCOTT, ”Introduction: ’Mode 2’ Revisited: 
The New Production of Knowledge”, Minerva, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, p. 179.
4 Bruno LATOUR, ”From the World of Science to the World of Research?”, Science, vol. 280, 
issue 5361, 1998, pp. 208-209.
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”[t]he re search proc ess can no longer be char ac ter ized as an ’ob jec tive’ in ves ti ga-
tion of the natu ral (or so cial) world, or as a cool and re duc tion ist in ter ro ga tion 
of ar bi trar ily deﬁned ’others’. Instead, it has become a dialogic process, an 
intense (and perhaps endless) ’conversation’ between research actors and 
research subjects – to such an extent that the basic vocabulary of research (who, 
whom, what, how) is in danger of losing its signiﬁcance. As a result, traditional 
notions of ’accountability’ have had to be radically revised. The consequences 
(predictable and unintended) of new knowledge cannot be regarded as being 
’outside’ the research process because problem-solving environments inﬂuence 
topic-choice and research-design as well as end-uses”1.
Draw ing, on these find ings, many par tici pa tory de moc rats have de fined a le-
giti macy prob lem: these new forms of ex per tise are a key ele ment of po liti cal de ci-
sion-mak ing, but they are more than just ’ad vi sory’ – as their fram ing as sump tions 
fun da men tally steer and cir cum scribe the (po liti cal) op tions avail able for regu la-
tion. Yet, de spite be ing ”so cially dis trib uted” and ”sub ject to mul ti ple ac count abili-
ties”, they are not ade quately in te grated into a frame work of ac count abil ity. This 
prob lem is, fur ther more, con sid ered by them to be il lus tra tive of the clear lim its of 
tra di tional rep re sen ta tive views of de moc racy. Tra di tional rep re sen ta tive de moc-
ratic in sti tu tions have not been able to deal with the new nor ma tive en vi ron ment. 
The an swer, hence, for the le giti macy prob lem is re li ance not on ”elu sive” and ”ob-
scure” mecha nisms of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, but on the epis temic and le giti miz-
ing vir tues of pub lic par tici pa tion.
Pub lic par tici pa tion, in these ar gu ments, achieves a se ries of ob jec tives: de-
moc ra tizes ex per tise and ren ders sci ence ”so cially ro bust”; and re places rep re sen-
ta tion. I will turn now to these two strands of ar gu ment.
Ex per tise, the En vi ron ment and Par tici pa tion
Po liti cal de ci sion mak ing, when con cern ing catas tro phic and/or ir re versi ble 
risks, faces a dou ble re quire ment: a nor ma tive and an epis temic one. Such de ci-
sional con texts, even more than oth ers, sug gest that be yond the need to se cure a 
solid nor ma tive ground for the choices been made, there is an equally im por tant 
im pera tive to get those choices right, in the sense of be ing sup ported by some epis-
temic cer ti fi ca tion. But sat is fy ing these two cri te ria is a com plex task, and mod ern 
de moc ratic rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions have been in creas ingly criti cized for pre fer-
ring one of them at the ex pense of the other, or even for ful fill ing nei ther in try ing 
to cor re spond to both. For some au thors, this ma jor co nun drum is part of the new, 
”re flex ive mod er nity” that il lus trates the new ”risk so ci ety”2.
The epis temic and le giti mat ing vir tues3 of pub lic par tici pa tion are an im por tant 
new di men sion of the par tici pa tory de moc ratic theo ries as they ex plore the risk 
regu la tory is sues, and the sci ence-poli tics re la tion ship in gen eral. These ar gu ments, 
1 Ibidem, p. 187, my emphasis.
2 Ulrich BECK, The Risk Society. Towards A New Modernity, Sage, London, 1992; Antony 
GIDDENS, ”Risk and Responsibility”, Modern Law Review, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 1-10. 
3 Sheila JASANOFF, ”Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science”, 
Minerva, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, pp. 223-244.
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re ly ing of ten on the above men tioned dis cus sions of the ”Mode 2” pro duc tion of 
knowl edge and its so cially dis persed char ac ter, af firm that, since much of the rele-
vant in for ma tion needed for good gov ern ance is ”lo cally pro duced” and em bed ded 
into lo cal prac tices, tra di tions, and tech niques, it fol lows that it is only ex tended and 
pub lic par tici pa tion in the risk as sess ment and man age ment phases that could bring 
up this cru cial ex per tise. This ”citi zen sci ence” fi nally repre sents not only an im por-
tant re source to be taped by the regu la tory in sti tu tions, but be comes the cen tral point 
of the epis temic cer ti fi ca tion of col lec tive par tici pa tory de ci sion-mak ing.
Re vers ing a tra di tional di vi sion be tween the ”lay” pub lic and the sci en tific 
com mu nity, these theo ries radi cally ex pand the scope of ex per tise and mul ti ply its 
cre den tials. Wide spread pub lic par tici pa tion in the pro duc tion of ex per tise and 
the man age ment of risks be comes, thus, a con di tion for the epis temic qual ity of de ci-
sion-mak ing. Be sides epito miz ing the de moc ratic le giti macy cri te rion, the par tici pa-
tory pro ce dures of fer also a more solid sci en tific ground for com plex de ci sions in 
con tem po rary so cie ties. Cor re spond ingly, rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions are found to 
be, ac cord ing to these ar gu ments, fail ing on both nor ma tive and epis temic cri te ria. 
To the ar gu ments that deny to po liti cal rep re sen ta tion its nor ma tive value, now 
they add the ar gu ment that, in many con tem po rary de ci sional con texts, the rep re-
sen ta tive in sti tu tion’s epis temic ground ing is, at best, in ade quate.
Sev eral po liti cal theo rists have used these find ings in or der to ad vo cate for 
more par tici pa tory and less rep re sen ta tive de moc ratic ar range ments in de sign ing 
en vi ron mental poli cies. The ”green” po liti cal the ory is es pe cially in ter ested in find-
ing and elabo rat ing a nor ma tive frame work in which to in te grate a num ber of ele-
ments that are – at least prima fa cie – dif fi cult to join to gether. From so cial (global) 
jus tice to en vi ron mental pro tec tion, es thetic con sid era tions, sus tain able growth, 
tech no logi cal in no va tion, ani mal rights, and the well be ing of fu ture gen era tions 
(int er gen era tional jus tice), these are some of the pri ori ties of green po liti cal theo riz-
ing that only un der score the dif fi culty of the task.
Yet, in re cent years, a cer tain pref er ence for pub lic par tici pa tory pro ce dures 
seems to emerge as the best an swer to the eco logi cal chal lenge in po liti cal the ory. 
An drew Dob son, Robyn Eck er sley and John Dryzek1, to men tion only a few au-
thors, have si mul ta ne ously ar gued that pub lic par tici pa tion is the most le giti mate 
pro ce dure that is also epis temi cally grounded – in this case, by pro duc ing more en-
vi ron men tally sus tain able de ci sions than other de ci sional pro ce dures, and by tak-
ing the in ter ests of na ture, ”oth ers”, or fu ture gen era tions bet ter into ac count – and, 
at the same time, they have ex pressed in vari ous de grees a sig nifi cant skep ti cism 
for the ca pac ity of rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions to ful fill this task.
Rather than sum ming up their ar gu ments here, I rather point to the com mon 
strand that I have iden ti fied as origi nat ing in a modi fied (de scrip tive) un der stand ing of 
the na ture of ex per tise and its re la tion to po liti cal de ci sion-mak ing, and evolv ing into a 
full blown nor ma tive ar gu ment that is in creas ingly shared by both sci ence, tech nol ogy 
and so ci ety ob serv ers, and by po liti cal theo rists of green cre den tials. This ar gu ment is fo-
cused on a se ri ous skep ti cism of the ca pac ity of tra di tional de moc ratic rep re sen ta tive 
1 Andrew DOBSON, Citizenship and the Environment, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2004; Robyn ECKERSLEY, The Green State. Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004; John S. DRYZEK, David DOWNES, Christian HUNOLD, David 
SCHLOSBERG, Hans-Kristian HERNES, Green States and Social Movements. Environmentalism in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003.
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in sti tu tions to be ac count able in this new de ci sional con text, as well as on the plea 
for par tici pa tory in clu sive pro ce dures that are claimed to be, si mul ta ne ously, bet ter 
em body ing nor ma tive ide als, and also bet ter adapted to face the epis temic de ci-
sional chal lenges of a con tem po rary risk so ci ety. I turn now to a brief ex po si tion of 
sev eral cur rent ar gu ments against rep re sen ta tive de moc ratic in sti tu tions.
Skep ti cism of Po liti cal Rep re sen ta tion
A cen tral tenet of re cent writ ings on the sci ence-poli tics re la tion ship and its 
nor ma tive con se quences has been the for mu la tion of a ”par tici pa tion ver sus rep re-
sen ta tion” di chot omy, rooted in a par ticu lar un der stand ing of the way in which 
con tem po rary so cie ties have been trans formed1.
Tra di tional rep re sen ta tive de moc ratic in sti tu tions are said to be un able to regu-
late global risks. One of the main char ac ter is tics of a ”risk so ci ety” is that there is a 
grow ing mis match be tween the states’ ter ri to rial au thor ity and the ex tra-ter ri to rial 
scope of re gional and global risks. Ac cord ing to Ul rich Beck, the mod ern wel fare 
state’s rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions were de signed to con trib ute to its le giti macy 
needs by – among oth ers – re-dis trib ut ing re sources. So cial jus tice con cerns were 
thus a cen tral jus ti fi ca tion for po liti cal rep re sen ta tion. But these same in sti tu tions 
have a dif fi cult time in trans form ing from re sources-re dis tribu tors, in risk-re dis-
tribu tors, adapt ing to what Beck de scribes as the main fea ture and chal lenge for po-
liti cal de ci sions in the risk so ci ety. Not only can rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tion not 
con trol the risks that are be yond their ju ris dic tions; they are also in creas ingly de-
pend ent on a sci en tific ex per tise that is fun da men tally con tested.
An other ar gu ment fre quently used in the lit era ture on risk regu la tion – but 
not spe cific to it – is that, given the in sti tu tional im bal ances and the re sources ine-
qual ity, such in sti tu tions are sub ject to ”cap ture” by ei ther eco nomic lob bies, or by 
the or gan ized pub lic ser vants, tech no crats etc. They be come cap tured in the sense 
that, in stead of ”rep re sent ing” the con stitu en cies’ in ter ests, pref er ences, and val-
ues, they be come de pend ent and serve in stead the in ter ests of the very ac tors they 
are sup posed to regu late, of pro fes sional or cor po ra tist or gani za tions, of sci en tific 
and bu reau cratic com mu ni ties, etc. Rea sons for this are the phi loso phy of in sti tu-
tional de sign, the sources of fund ing, or the re mote ness from the pub lic’s in put. Re-
cent risk regu la tory fail ures in Europe and else where (as the BSE/ CJD ”mad 
cow” scare) have been char ac ter ized as fail ures of rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions and 
of their use of ex per tise2, and as sig nal ing the need for a com plete re shuf fle of the 
ex per tise and regu la tory in sti tu tional de sign in many coun tries and EU3.
Of course, the worry that po liti cal rep re sen ta tives cease to be con cerned with 
the com mon good or the pub lic in ter est, and be come par tial to, or de pend ent on, 
pri vate in ter est, is a clas si cal prob lem of po liti cal phi loso phy. Some au thors have, 
1 Charles THORPE, ”Political Theory in Science and Technology Studies”, in Edward J. HACKETT, 
Olga AMSTERDAMSKA, Michael LYNCH, Judy VAJCMAN (eds.), The Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, Third Edition, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008, p. 63 (my emphasis). 
2 Sheila JASANOFF, ”Civilization and Madness: The Great BSE Scare of 1996”, Public 
Understanding of Science, vol. 6, no. 3, 1997, pp. 221-232.
3 Damian CHALMERS, ”'Food for Thought': Reconciling European Risks and Traditional 
Ways of Life”, Modern Law Review vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 532–562.
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fol low ing Rous seau, iden ti fied po liti cal rep re sen ta tion it self as the con cep tual 
prob lem; mod ern re pub li can ism, as well as po liti cal lib er al ism, have, how ever 
con served the cen tral ity of the con cept of rep re sen ta tion in po liti cal theo riz ing.
In green po liti cal the ory, the skep ti cism re gard ing po liti cal rep re sen ta tion 
and the de mands for pub lic par tici pa tion in col lec tive de ci sions is a cen tral tenet 
of a large and grow ing lit era ture. Tra di tional po liti cal rep re sen ta tives are por-
trayed as too weak in con front ing the eco nomic ac tors, or gan ized sci en tific ex per-
tise, or in suf fi ciently bal anc ing the needs, the de sires, the con sid ered in ter ests of 
their con stitu en cies, of hu man ity, of na ture, of fu ture gen era tions etc. As we have 
seen, de spite the sheer com plex ity of the au then tic and fun da men tal value- (and 
fact-) based con flicts, much of this dif fi culty is ex pected to be solved through more 
town meet ings, con sen sus con fer ences and the ”de moc ra ti za tion of ex per tise”.
It is worth men tion ing that, con cern ing the prob lem atic of risk regu la tion, skep-
ti cism of the po ten tial of rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions to sat isfy stan dards of le giti macy 
has also been voiced from a con ser va tive, mini mal-state re cent trend that de mands 
de-regu la tion, and which con tends that re cent regu la tory fail ures have clearly shown 
the in ca pac ity of gov ern ments to con trol an in creas ingly un ac count able bu reau cratic 
and sci en tific ap pa ra tus. Given the su pe rior ra tion al ity of the mar ket, and its fairer al-
lo ca tion of risks and bene fits, the state should be less in volved in sub stan tial de ci-
sions, con trol ling and dis trib ut ing bur dens and bene fits or man ag ing risks. The 
in creas ing de pend ence of mod ern life on sci ence – and the com plex ity and un cer tain-
ties as so ci ated with it – can only am plify the state’s track of fail ure and plan ning dis-
as ters. Po liti cal rep re sen ta tion should, there fore, be side lined not, as in the ac counts 
stud ies above, in fa vor of greater pub lic par tici pa tion, but, on the con trary, in fa vor of 
the mar ket mecha nisms and mini mal regu la tory agen cies.
THE PARTICIPATION VS. REPRESENTATION DICHOTOMY
The ac count de vel oped in this ar ti cle is not, of course, an ar gu ment against 
spe cific forms of par tici pa tion and vari ous par tici pa tory prac tices, which can in-
deed im prove the le giti macy and the qual ity of the de ci sion-mak ing proc ess. I am 
how ever con cerned about the in creas ingly hege monic and ex clu sion ary role that 
the nor ma tive dis course about pub lic par tici pa tion tends to have in these re cent de-
bates in po liti cal the ory, in as far as it tends to equate pub lic par tici pa tion to le giti-
macy and as the op po site of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion. Again, I am fully aware that 
vari ous for mal and in for mal set tings for par tici pa tion are a very im por tant part of 
deal ing with the com plex le giti macy is sues that con tem po rary poli ties are con-
cerned with; but re duc ing that nor ma tive com plex ity to a pro ce dural view of pub-
lic par tici pa tion is nei ther help ful nor well-founded.
More over, I do not ques tion the more com plex stud ies of the sci ence-poli tics re la-
tion ship. Risk regu la tion, for in stance, has in deed cru cial po liti cal ”fram ing as sump-
tions” that steer each of its phases; and a facts vs. val ues sepa ra tion is cer tainly not 
ade quate to char ac ter ize this proc ess. These ”fram ing as sum tions” are of a po liti cal phi-
loso phi cal na ture and have only re cently be come an ob ject of study in its own right1.
1 Andreas KLINKE, Marion DREYER, Ortwin RENN, Andrew STIRLING, Patrick VAN 
ZWANENBERG, ”Precautionary Risk Regulation in European Governance”, Journal of Risk 
Research, vol. 9, no. 4, 2006, pp. 373-392. 
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My ob jec tion has sev eral ele ments. The first re fers to the way in which the con-
sid era tions on sci ence, ex per tise and poli tics have been in stru men tal ized by par tici-
pa tory de moc rats for ex pand ing their cri tique of lib eral rep re sen ta tive de moc racy. 
Whether or not Sci ence and Tech nol ogy Stud ies have a built-in bias against lib eral 
val ues, as some au thors con tend1, there is no easy tran si tion from a de scrip tive 
analy sis of the role ex per tise plays in pol icy-mak ing to a unique nor ma tive fram ing 
of the le giti macy is sues that arise. Sec ond, I con tend that fram ing the prob lem of le-
giti macy of ex per tise in terms of the de sir abil ity of de moc ra tiz ing ex per tise through 
pub lic par tici pa tion is prob lem atic, on sev eral lev els. Third, I ar gue that, try ing to 
re place rep re sen ta tion by par tici pa tion sig nals an im por tant con cep tual con fu sion 
and a mis un der stand ing of the con di tions of de moc racy it self.
I ad vance, here, a more ge neric reti cence con cern ing the cur rent fo cus on ”de-
moc ra tiz ing sci ence” through pub lic par tici pa tion: as we have seen, the de scrip tive 
re fram ing of the sci ence-poli tics re la tion is trans formed, by radi cal de moc racy 
theo rists, into a nor ma tive prob lem, that of a de moc ratic defi cit. But my ob jec tion 
is, this is not a ”new” defi cit. This is a very clas si cal prob lem in po liti cal the ory: the 
re la tion be tween de moc racy and ex per tise has al ways been a prob lem atic one, 
”[a]t least since the first de moc racy exe cuted its most promi nent ex pert”2. As it 
will be ar gued in the last sec tion of this ar ti cle, po liti cal phi loso phy has long been 
con cerned with the vari ous cru cial nor ma tive con flicts that con sti tute the back-
ground of po liti cal de ci sions. Well be fore be ing some how brushed over and dis-
solved into pub lic par tici pa tion, fun da men tal con flicts and di lem mas such as 
de lib era tion vs. par tici pa tion, in ter ests vs. de sires, stake holders vs. share hold ers, 
have all been the ma te rial upon which re flec tion on rep re sen ta tion has been build. 
In the words of Isaiah Ber lin, these amount to ”tragic choices” that ac knowl edge 
the in com mensura bil ity of val ues and the au then tic ity of the plu ral ism in mod ern 
so cie ties. Noth ing in the re vamped con cep tion on sci ence and poli tics man dates 
the hope that these clas si cal co nun drums are now eas ier to solve by ap peal ing to 
the con sen sus-build ing pro ce dural ca paci ties of par tici pa tory de moc racy. In fact, 
none of the clas si cal prob lems of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion – which make its con cept 
both rich and com plex at the same time – seem to find an ade quate an swer in the 
cur rent par tici pa tory ac counts.
I con tend, fur ther more, that not only is the prob lem of le giti macy in these ac-
counts mostly wrongly framed; but also that the nor ma tive dis course on par tici pa-
tion is based on fun da men tally prob lem atic con cep tual, prac ti cal, and – in the 
end, – nor ma tive as sump tions.
On a prac ti cal level, cer tain time-, mo ti va tional-, and re sources-based con-
straints on the re ali za tion of par tici pa tory de moc racy are smoothed in too easy 
terms. Ques tions such as those of time man age ment, the fi nan cial bur dens, and 
the di lemma of (co er cively) im pos ing par tici pa tion seem to at tract lit tle at ten tion 
1 Charles THORPE, ”Political Theory in Science and Technology Studies”, cit., pp. 63-82. 
According to Thorpe, many STS scholars criticize the classical understanding of science of Karl 
Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Robert K. Merton as ”exemplifying and upholding liberal [or conser-
vative] political ideals and values” (p. 63).
2 Mark B. BROWN, Justus LENTSCH and Peter WEINGART, ”Representation, Expertise, 
and the German Parliament: A Comparison of Three Advisory Institutions”, in Democratization of 
Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making – Sociology of the 
Sciences, vol. 24, Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, pp. 81-100.
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in these ac counts. Fur ther more, pos it ing such high ide als of pub lic par tici pa tion 
against the back ground of an un re al is ti cally op ti mist con cep tion of hu man mo ti va-
tions amounts, in fact, to build ing the cen tral le giti mat ing cri te rion on coun ter fac-
tual or im plau si ble con di tions; an ade quate the ory of le giti macy has to give a 
more solid ac count of the ”cir cum stances of le giti macy”, and of the con di tions of 
pos si bil ity of de moc racy, lest it ig nores the ”ought im plies can” im pera tive.
More over, there is a strong ar gu ment that, in fact, pub lic par tici pa tion nec es sar-
ily col lapses into some form of rep re sen ta tion, ren der ing the par tici pa tory ac counts 
con cep tu ally un in tel li gi ble1. As David Plotke ar gues, rep re sen ta tion is de moc racy. 
Any par tici pa tory set ting has to se lect and dele gate agenda set ters, or gan iz ers, de-
cide on be half of ab sents etc., such that it al ways has im por tant ele ments of rep re sen-
ta tion. In fact, the fram ing it self of the op po si tion ”rep re sen ta tion vs. par tici pa tion” 
is con cep tu ally prob lem atic: as Plotke writes in the in tro duc tion of his es say:
”[T]he op po site of rep re sen ta tion is not par tici pa tion. The op po site of 
rep re sen ta tion is ex clu sion. And the op po site of par tici pa tion is ab sten tion. 
Rather than op pos ing par tici pa tion to rep re sen ta tion, we should try to im-
prove rep re sen ta tive prac tices and forms to make them more open, ef fec tive, 
and fair. Rep re sen ta tion is not an un for tu nate com pro mise be tween an ideal 
of di rect de moc racy and messy mod ern re ali ties. Rep re sen ta tion is cru cial in 
con sti tut ing de moc ratic prac tices. ’Di rect’ de moc racy is not pre cluded by the 
scale of mod ern poli tics. It is un fea si ble be cause of core fea tures of poli tics 
and de moc racy as such”2.
An other prob lem atic way in which ”par tici pa tion” is used by con tem po rary 
radi cal or green de moc ratic theo rists against rep re sen ta tion, con sists in the re cur-
rent con fu sion of pro ce dures with sub stan tive out comes, as it be comes ap par ent 
in the lit era ture which ad vo cates pub lic par tici pa tion in or der to fur ther the agen-
da of en vi ron mental pro tec tion. De plor ing the en vi ron mental pro tec tion re cord 
track of tra di tional rep re sen ta tive de moc ratic in sti tu tions, such writ ings ar gue 
that pub lic par tici pa tion should prove more en vi ron men tally-friendly than the 
vari ous forms of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion. As po liti cal theo rists as di verse as Robert 
Goodin and Roger Scruton3 have ob served, how ever, there is no con cep tual con-
nec tion, no plau si ble ex pla na tion of why par tici pat ing in di vidu als may de cide to 
sac ri fice what ever pref er ences they may have for the sake of na ture, spe cies pres er-
va tion, land scape beauty, or fu ture gen era tions. In the words of Goodin:
”To ad vo cate de moc racy is to ad vo cate pro ce dures, to ad vo cate en vi ron-
men tal ism is to ad vo cate sub stan tive out comes: what guar an tee can we have 
that the for mer pro ce dures will yield the lat ter sorts of out comes?”4
Pub lic par tici pa tory ac counts rely on the con vic tion that, un der the right cir cum-
stances, pub lic de lib era tion can cre ate con sen sus, can bet ter as sess and man age 
1 David PLOTKE, ”Representation Is Democracy”, Constellations, vol. 4, no.1, 1997, pp. 19-34.
2 Ibidem, p. 19.
3 Roger SCRUTON, ”Conservatism”, in Andrew DOBSON, Robyn ECKERSLEY (eds.), Political 
Theory and the Ecological Challenge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 7-19.
4 See Robert GOODIN, Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 168; Cited 
from Terence BALL, ”Democracy”, in Andrew DOBSON, Robyn ECKERSLEY (eds.), Political 
Theory…cit., p. 134.
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con tem po rary risks, can bet ter ap proach the in ter-gen era tional jus tice is sues, can bet-
ter pro tect na ture. Yet the em piri cal evi dence is in con clu sive, while the more con cep-
tual ob jec tions raised above seem to lead to the rather op po site con clu sions.
It is, of course, true that there is a cer tain prob lem con cern ing the ”le giti macy of 
ex per tise”, but to ade quately frame that prob lem is not easy. In fact, the radi cal, par-
tici pa tory de moc racy lit era ture sur veyed in this ar ti cle too of ten re lies on con cep tual 
ra courcis, short cuts that in the cur rent nor ma tive dis course of ”par tici pa tion” brush 
very fast over fun da men tal and old prob lems. There is, more over, an im por tant rhe-
tori cal di men sion in volved in the ap peals to pub lic par tici pa tion – as if eve ry one 
knows or should know that it nec es sar ily in creases le giti macy, that it pro duces cor-
rect de ci sions and that it works in prac tice. I ar gue in the next sec tion that, de spite 
this ap par ent com mon sense view, the con nec tion be tween rep re sen ta tion, par tici pa-
tion and ac count abil ity is more com plex, and that in an im por tant sense, which 
might seem para doxi cal, greater ac count abil ity de pends on tak ing more se ri ously 
po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, rather than fo cus ing ex clu sively on par tici pa tion.
TAKING SERIOUSLY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
The clas si cal treat ment of the con cept of rep re sen ta tion, that of Hanna Pit kin1, 
of fers a sub tle yet gen er ous un der stand ing of the con cep tual uni verse of the idea, 
and es pe cially so in its po liti cal dec li na tion. Ac cord ing to her, po liti cal phi loso-
phers such as Hobbes or Burke have only of fered par tial glimpses into that ”rath-
er com pli cated, con vo luted, three-di men sional [con cep tual] struc ture”. Closer to 
meta phor, Pit kin opens the con cept of rep re sen ta tion to a more sym bolic mean ing, 
namely, ”the mak ing pre sent in some sense of some thing which is nev er the less 
not pre sent lit er ally or in fact”.
This clas si cal ac count al lows and in vites us to ”take se ri ously” the nor ma tive 
po ten tial of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion. More over, the in ter nal ten sions and the con-
flicts be tween its as pects are not lim its, but con sti tute the con cept it self, and as 
such rep re sen ta tion makes pos si ble the very po liti cal re la tions that we try to re fine 
and re form. The di lem mas of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, from dele gate vs. trus tee, to 
rep re sent ing con sid ered in ter ests vs. rep re sent ing con tin gent de sires, and to the 
defi ni tion of con stitu en cies, they are the sub stance of poli tics, and hence the cir-
cum stances of de moc racy.
I fol low Ernesto La clau, here, in ar gu ing that rep re sen ta tion – with its struc-
tural di lem mas – is con sti tu tive to poli tics it self:
”Re la tions of rep re sen ta tion are not a sec on dary level re flect ing a pri mary 
so cial re al ity con sti tuted else where; they are, on the con trary, the pri mary ter-
rain within which the so cial is con sti tuted. Any kind of po liti cal trans for ma tion 
will, as a re sult, take place as an in ter nal dis place ment of the ele ments en ter ing 
the rep re sen ta tion proc ess […] [R]epre sen ta tion is not a sec ond best, as Rous-
seau would have had it, re sult ing from the in creas ing chasm be tween the uni-
ver sal com mu ni tarian space and the par ticu lar ism of the ac tu ally ex ist ing 
1 Hanna F. PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1967. See also, Michael SAWARD, “Representation”, in Andrew DOBSON, Robyn ECKERSLEY 
(eds.), Political Theory…cit., pp. 183-199.
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col lec tive wills. On the con trary, the asym me try be tween com mu nity as a 
whole and col lec tive wills is the source of that ex hila rat ing game that we call 
poli tics, from which we find our lim its but also our pos si bili ties”1.
In a simi lar vein, we have seen, David Plotke ar gues that rep re sen ta tion is 
de moc racy:
”De moc ratic poli tics is con sti tuted partly through rep re sen ta tion. Rep re sen-
ta tion is con struc tive, pro duc ing knowl edge, the ca pac ity to share in sights, and 
the abil ity to reach dif fi cult agree ments. It en tails a ca pac ity for rec og niz ing 
so cial re la tions in or der to con sider chang ing them. Rep re sen ta tion also helps 
to con sti tute de moc ratic in sti tu tions. It re quires pro ce dures for tak ing de ci-
sions, and there have to be ways of sus tain ing those de ci sions over time”2.
Forms of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion are, in the words of Plotke, proc esses of “art-
ful con struc tion”, as is de moc ratic poli tics it self. The task of po liti cal the ory, then, 
is to con tinue to ex plore the po ten tial of the clas si cal no tions of po liti cal rep re sen-
ta tion and po liti cal ac count abil ity, which re cent radi cal de moc ratic writ ings have 
rather ob scured.
Part of our un der stand ing of what po liti cal le giti macy and re spon si bil ity in a 
de moc ratic com mu nity means is a bi-di rec tional re la tion ship, ”in which the re la-
tion be tween ruler and ruled takes the form of rep re sen ta tion and the re la tion in 
which the ruled con trol the ruler takes the form of ac count abil ity”3. My claim in 
this ar ti cle has been that, by prais ing the ex clu sive le giti ma tory vir tues of pub lic 
par tici pa tion at the ex pense of the rich but com plex po ten tial of po liti cal rep re sen ta-
tion, the re sult is, more of ten than not, a fur ther weak en ing of the ac count abil ity, 
and hence po liti cal re spon si bil ity of the ”tra di tional” rep re sen ta tive in sti tu tions. 
At the end of the day, ar gu ments that press for ”more” par tici pa tion while play ing 
down and mis un der stand ing the clas si cal puz zles of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion can-
not, for this very rea son, in crease po liti cal ac count abil ity.
The nec es sary, un avoid able ”gray ar eas”4 of the con cept of rep re sen ta tion are, 
in fact, its rich ness. Pub lic par tici pa tory ac counts can not shed de fini tive light on 
these ar eas, for the rea son that they are both in sur mount able and con sti tu tive to our 
po liti cal prac tices. These ”gray ar eas” of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion cor re spond to the 
ten sions and di choto mies that have been the cen tral con cern of clas si cal and mod-
ern ac counts. Among them, the di chot omy be tween act ing as a dele gate or as a trus-
tee is fun da men tal. Be tween the two poles (act ing as a pure dele gate/trus tee) is one 
of the ”gray ar eas” where the main po ten tial for nor ma tive elabo ra tions re sides.
Re fer ring to these in ter nal ten sions of the con cept of rep re sen ta tion, Pit kin 
writes:
”This para doxi cal re quire ment, that a thing be both pre sent and not pre sent, at 
the same time, is pre cisely what ap pears in the man date and in de pend ence theo-
rists’ con flict ing views about the mean ing of rep re sen ta tion. What con cep tual 
1 Ernesto LACLAU, ”Populism: What’s in a Name?”, in Francisco PANIZZA (ed.), Populism 
and the Mirror of Democracy, Verso, London, 2005, p. 49.
2 David PLOTKE, ”Representation Is Democracy”, cit., pp. 31-32. 
3 Stephen TURNER, ”Expertise and Political Responsibility. The Columbia Shuttle Ca-
tastrophe”, in Democratization of Expertise?... cit., p. 101.
4 Roland PENNOCK, ”Political Representation: An Overview”, in Roland PENNOCK, John 
W. CHAPMAN, Nomos X: Representation, Atherton Press, New York, 1968, pp. 3-27.
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analy sis seems to have turned up here is not any kind of ’mis use’ of a con cept 
or dis tor sion of its or di nary mean ing. The con cept of rep re sen ta tion just does 
seem to be para doxi cal in mean ing, is in tended to ex press a di choto mous 
idea. At most one can say that there is a mis take (but not mis use) to con cen-
trate on only half the para dox, rather than the whole”1.
The role of po liti cal theo ries is, in the nor ma tive space and the gray ar eas 
opened by these con cep tual ac counts, pre cisely that of fig ur ing out who are the 
sub jects to be rep re sented, what the in di vid ual or pub lic in ter est con sists in and 
how it should be rep re sented, how to ex press the po liti cal plu ral ism and moral con-
tro ver sies in a po liti cal com mu nity.
From this per spec tive, pub lic par tici pa tion can not nor ma tively re place po liti-
cal rep re sen ta tion. Radi cal de moc racy theo rists con tend that po liti cal rep re sen ta-
tion is faulty, does not work, and that citi zens have to par tici pate in or der to 
com pen sate that le giti macy defi cit. But the ar gu ment ad vanced here shows that 
such con ten tions rest on fun da men tal con cep tual and phi loso phi cal con fu sions – 
about the na ture of the po liti cal as well as about the idea of rep re sen ta tion it self.
It is very true that many po liti cal rep re sen ta tives try to for feit their re spon si bil ity 
by re fer ring too of ten to sci en tific ex per tise – with its aura of im par ti al ity and ob jec tiv-
ity – but the we should not ad dress that prob lem by mini miz ing their rep re sen ta tive 
ca pac ity; on the con trary, they can be come more ac count able – with all the lim its of 
that con cept – pre cisely is po liti cal rep re sen ta tion is taken se ri ously.
Par tici pa tory de moc racy is based on the as sump tion that we all can, in prin ci ple, 
reach con sen sus on con tro ver sial and com plex is sues. But we can not, since most of our 
dis agree ments are fun da men tal and au then tic. This is pre cisely why po liti cal rep re sen-
ta tion makes sense, as con sti tut ing po liti cal au thor ity in the con text of im pos si ble una-
nim ity. Po liti cal rep re sen ta tives are there to make these tragic choices on our be half, as 
Isaiah Ber lin would put it, and judge the im por tant trade-offs that are there to be made 
be tween the vari ous com pet ing, in com pati ble choices and al ter na tive fu tures.
Again, it is not the prac tice of pub lic par tici pa tion, but the (aca demic) nor ma-
tive dis course that fo cuses on it in an ex clu sion ary man ner, that has been the ob-
ject of criti cism in this ar ti cle. By pro pos ing to sub sti tute citi zens’ par tici pa tion 
and citi zen sci ence for po liti cal rep re sen ta tion as the main re posi tory of le giti macy 
in con tem po rary de moc ra cies, it is, tragi cally, poli tics it self which tends to be dis-
solved into risk regu la tion.
The prob lem of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion is hence thorn ier and the con cept it-
self much richer than radi cal par tici pa tory de moc rats as sume. One of the con se-
quences of their ex clu sion ary nor ma tive fo cus on pub lic par tici pa tion is, ef fec tively, 
of pre ma turely and em phati cally ’clos ing’ the de bate. The re sources of nor ma tiv-
ity in con tem po rary po liti cal the ory are ac cord ingly re duced, even while the de-
clared aim of these ac counts is pre cisely to enlarge and dis en fran chise the 
cate go ries of de moc ratic sub jects and of po liti cal choices. Yet by fail ing to per ceive 
the nor ma tive po ten tial of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion, the very le giti macy prob lems 
of con tem po rary de moc ra cies2 turned out mis con strued.
1 Hanna PITKIN, ”Commentary: The Paradox of Representation”, in Roland PENNOCK, 
John W. CHAPMAN, Nomos X…cit., pp.38-42.
2 Philip KITCHER, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
